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a call to resist illegitimate authority

THE FALKLANDS
AND THE BOMB

''FREE ELECTIONS''
IN EL SALVADOR
FRANK BRODHEAD

What if Argentina had The Bomb?
What if behind the comic opera exterior of the British
armada sailing against Argentina there lurked the possibility of a "nuclear exchange"?
There has never been even a small war between two
countries that both possessed nuclear weapons. Yet the
time is surely coming closer when two nuclear powers
engage in armed conflict. Last year the US government
estimated that 12 non-nuclear nations would have the
technical capability of detonating a nuclear bomb by
1984. Eleven more, including Argentina, were expected
to have that capability by the end of the decade.
If Argentina possessed even a small arsenal of nuclear
weapons wouldn't the British fleet be carrying a
"deterent"? And, following the logic of Alexander
Haig, would not Argentina leave open the possibility of
a first use of tactical nuclear weapons if confronted with
overwhelming "conventional" force? Surely members
of the Argentine general staff must even now be arguing
that Britain would never dare to undertake their rescue
expedition if Argentina had a nuclear threat. What
lessons are the generals of other potential nuclear
powers drawing from this conflict?
Argentina possesses an operating nuclear power
plant, and has ·already produced enough plutonium to
make a bomb. The US played a significant early role in
Argentina's nuclear energy program, but in recent years
has refused to do so because Argentina has not signed
the Non-Proliferation Treaty or agreed to accept safeguards_on nuclear fuel. Switzerland and West Germany
have stepped in, selling a heavy water plant and a power
·reactor to Argentina without requiring safeguards.
Since 1980 Argentina and Brazil have been cooperating
in nuclear energy development, and Argentina in turn
has been supplying assistance to the nuclear energy
programs of Peru, Paraguay, Chile and other Latin
American countries. Several planes in Argentina's air
force are capable of delivering nuclear weapons,
including more than 100 US A-4 Skyhawks.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 included a
pledge by the nuclear powers to conduct serious negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Yet since that
time the number of strategic nuclear warheads has
tripled. Unless the nuclear powers disarm, other nations
will push ahead with nuclear weapons, and the next
Falklands expedition won't be so funny.

Is "El Salvador" Spanish for "Vietnam"? In spite of
Secretary of State Alexander Haig's stout denials, the
analogy just won't go away. The US 'role in the recent
elections in El Salvador, with its official State Department observer team, evokes the memory of Vietnam
once again. For how can we forget Vietnam's presidential elections of 1967, and the US observer team which
judged this exercise in fraud to be ''reasonably free and
reasonably honest''?
The March 28th elections in El Salvador were called
by one US official ''the most thoroughly observed
elections here and maybe anywhere else." At least
twenty countries responded to El Salvador's inyitation
to send official observer teams to view the balloting. Yet
many countries refused El Salvador's invitation, and
among those sending observers were Argentina, Chile,
Uruguay and Guatemala, hardly experts in the practice
of fair elections. Much of the international opposition
to sending observers, and to the elections themselves,
supported the rebels' claims that the elections were
inherently unfair. With their leaders marked for death
by hit squads based in the army and the right wing
parties, El Salvador's revolutionaries claimed that
political campaigning would be suicidal for them, and
called for a boycott of the elections.
Much of the international criticism of the proposed
elections for a constituent assembly was based on the
assumption that the army and the Duarte regime would
· receive a rubber stamp. In an attempt to legitimize the
elections in the eyes of the international community and
a restive American public, therefore, the State Department announced in early March that they would send an
official observer team to monitor the election, thus
ensuring its fairness. Led by Senator Nancy Kassebaum
of Kansas, the team included two "election experts",
Richard Scammon and Howard Penniman, both of
whom were part of the observer team sent to South
Vietnam in 1967.
Washington's original goal was to legitimate a sweep
by Duarte and the Christian Democrats. As the election
drew closer, however, the function of the observer team
changed. While speculation grew _that the right wing
continued on page 2

''reasonably free and reasonably honest,'' while
anqther poined out ''that irregularities were unlikely
since the election law forbade them."
But even as the observer team was reporting to
Johnson that the election had been "fair" and "admirable,'' evidence of widespread fraud was accumulating
1n South Vietnam. Massive demonstratfons were held 1n
Saigon, and a committee of South Vietnam's Assembly
declared the election invalid because of a blatant
"pattern of fraud." But under pressure from the US
embassy and the Thieu-Ky military forces who
surrounded the Assembly and invaded its balconies, the
Assembly at last voted to confirm the election results.
The election runnerup, who campaigned on a peace
platform, was jailed.
The function of the monitoring team in Vietnam, as
in El Salvador, was to give the elections the appearance
of legitimacy. In this they were only momentarily
successful. A month later came the demonstration at the
Pentagon and the beginning of a militant anti-war
movement in the US. And at the end of January, 1968
came the Tet offensive, which turned President
Johnson's hopes to dust. While the Reagan administration is congratulating itself over the supposedly high
turnout in El Salvador, moreover, it should ponder a
turnout of 84% in South Vietnam just four months
before Tet. The case of Vietnam, in short, should call
into question whether techniques that might be used to
ensure free and fair elections in Mayor Daley's Chicago
are adequate to measure the will of the people in a
country undergoing a revolution.
·
The real function of El Salvador's closely observed
elections may well be a tragic one. When the US sent a
team of "independent" observers to legitimize the
South Vietnamese election in 1967, it cemented itself
forever to the Thieu-Ky regime to which· it gave birth.
One can now imagine Alexander Haig countering liberal
congressional protests against further US support for El
Salvador's murderous coalition of right wing thugs with
smug appeals to "the process of democracy" and "the
will of the Salvadoran people." In doing so, however,
he should bear in mind the observations about the 1967
Vietnam election made by George McT. K~hin and
John Lewis in their study The United States in Vietnam:
"With the elections over, President Johnson could now
assure the American public that the sacrifices they were
making in Vietnam were in support of a 'legitimate,'
freely elected government. . . . The opportunity for
effectively broadening the base of the Saigon regime
had been lost .... As a consequence, in any future negotiations Washington's options would be narrowly
restricted by the predictably rigid viewpoint of a highly
unrepresentative South Vietnamese government, whose
popular base was so narrow that it could not risk any
meaningful compromise without courting its own
destruction." (p. 359)

parties would gain a majority, and that the proto-fascist
ARENA party headed by former Maj. Roberto
D' Aubuisson tnight actually gain a plurality, the
Reagan administration backpeddled furiously. Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press" on election day, Haig
stressed that the US was not wedded to a particular
candidate, but to a set of policies. If the voters elected a
constituent assembly dominated by right wing forces,
"that's their business." Thus the role of "free and fair
elections", monitored by observers from many nations,
now became the means by which the Reagan administration could gracefully transfer its support from the
alleged center of El Salvador's political spectrum to
unabashed supporters of the right.
The process of legitimizing an election is a complex
one. But it is not obvious that high class poll watchers
from other countries are adequate to the task. Because
election experts Scammon and Penniman have now
given their stamp of approval to both El Salvador's
election and South Vietnam's presidential election of
1967, it might help us to understand the process at work
in El Salvador better if · we briefly look at South
Vietnam's election and the role played in it by the
official US observer team.
Free Elections

In early 1967, noted the Pentagon Papers, "prenomination maneuvering and legitimacy of the Presidential campaign were the subjects which occupied
American attention· above all else.'' At that time the US
had 385,000 troops in Vietnam, and military strategists
were calling for up to 200,000 more. Yet US opinion on
the war was polarized, and the unsavory image of the
South Vietnam military dictatorship in the US media
impeded the Johnson administration's plans for more
decisive military action. "Free elections" were the
answer to this impasse.
But not too free. Washington feared that the election
would split the South Vietnamese military. The military,
in turn, feared civilian rule. But all could agree that
"neutralists" and "leftists" had to be barred from
running as candidates or even voting, and after much
maneuvering the military united on Chief of State Thieu
and Marshall ("Hitler is my hero") Ky as the winning
ticket.
But even within the restrictive conditions set for the
elections, the actions of the Thieu-Ky forces led to widespread accusations of fraud, both within South Vietnam
and the US. Twelve US Senators charged that the campaign was a "fraud" and a "charade," and President
Johnson himself admitted that the elections were "not
without blemish.''
And so the team of 20 election observers was packed
off to Vietnam to monitor the final three days of the
campaign, where they had a brief and controlled visit.
One member examined ballot boxes to make sure they
had a bottom. Another compared the election to those
back in Beverly Hills. Prominently featured were the
"election experts," one of whom called the election
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anthropologist writing in Cultural Survival Quarterly:

NICARAGUA'S
MISKITO PROBLEM

The Miskito monarchy was always more symbolic than
political. . . For a few Miskitos, the kingdom provided
justification for attacks on neighbors or demands for
tribute ... For the average Miskito, the king mattered little.
Although appointed by the Crown, kings could not exercise
authority without first consulting with a council of elders,
and·(Macdonald quotes anthropologist Mary Helms) "even
the'n their directions were followed only if their constituents
felt inclined to do so."

AMANDA CLAIBORNE

According to Alexander Haig, they were being
dropped from airplanes. He showed us a picture of
burned bodies; only problem was the picture was four
years old, a massacre by Somoza's National Guard. The
Cuban Missile Crisis expert showed us ''before and
after" photos of destroyed Miskito villages. Jeane
Kirkpatrick told us that the Nicaraguan government was
carrying out ''a campaign of systematic violence."
What do the Sandinistas say? :

Despite the fact that the ''kingdom'' was primarily a
convenient British fiction, shortly after problems first
arose between the Sandinistas and the Miskito leadership Madonald tells us that ''the Nicaraguan press
claimed that [the Miskitos] were trying to re-establish
the 'kingdom'."
In 1894 the Atlantic Coast was incorporated into the
rest of Nicaragua and North American imperialism
replaced British colonialism. The Miskitos no longer
traded food for muskets, but instead worked in USowned gold and silver mines and grew bananas for
export. Macdonald notes that

The revolutionary government was forced to relocate the
riverside communities in more secure areas of the national
territory where our Miskito brethren will have, for the first
time, access to systematic medical assistance, education,
adequate housing, electricity and cultivable land. The relocation has given rise to a ferocious, slanderous campaign of
lies mounted by the CIA and the State Department against
our revolution. - Sergio Ramirez Mercado (The Nation,
4/3/82)

bananas were produced in Miskito gardens rather than on
the extensive land-gobbling plantations which dominated
Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. None of these new
salaried or contract economic activities precluded regular
maintenance of garden plots. Subsistence farming, with the
security and economic independence it provided, continued
to dominate an economy which was also linked to capitalism and wage labor.

Well what do we believe: bloodbath or a solicitous
government concerned above all with the safety and
well-being of the Indians?
The reality is considerably more complicated than the
explanation so far advanced by the Sandinistas, but
most certainly falls far short of the bloodbath thesis
expounded by our State Department (see N. Chomsky
and E. S. Herman's The Washington Connection and
Third World Fascism for State Department use of the
"nefarious and mythical" bloodbath in Indochina to
excuse its own more "constructive" bloodbaths there).

Following World War II, US lumbering operations
largely denuded the huge pine forests of the region and
forcibly removed"Indians from their l~md. To revive the
industry exhausted by the early 1960's, Somoza initiated
a massive reforestation project. According to
Macdonald
Large tracts of land utilized by the Miskitos were ''nationalized'' and the Miskito were prohibited from extracting
lumber. For the first time, the state and market economies
were seen as a threat to the Miskito's claim to land and
natural resources. Shortly thereafter, in 1967, local Indian
organizations developed along the Coco River. Four years
later, Nicaragua's first national Indian organization,
Alpromisu, was formed to protect rights to land and
natural resources. Violence punctuated Alpromisu's early
history. Somoza's guardia disrupted meetings and frequently jailed Alpromisu officials. The organization was
charged with attempting to encourage separatism, and
regionalism, and associating with foreign enemies.

Some History

The Miskitos are the largest Indian group in Nicaragua. Along with the much smaller Sumu and Rama
tribes they make up about 10% of the Nicaraguan population. Although a minority of the population as a
whole, on Nicaragua's isolated and sparsely populated
Atlantic Coast they were, until recently, the majority.
Mainly due to its geographic isolation, the Atlantic
Coast and its people have historically enjoyed a good
deal of autonomy. In the early colonial period, the
Spaniards failed to take over the Coast and the Miskitos
thus escaped the brutal treatment suffered by Indians
elsewhere under the Spanish yoke. While maintaining
their subsistence agricultural economy, the Miskitos
began trade with British merchants for manufactured
goods, from one of which, the musket, they derived
their name. At one point the British invented a country
of "Mosquitia" and crowned a king who was, incidentally, amenable to making his country a British protectorate. But, according to Theodore Macdonald, an

Enter the Sandinistas, as Macdonald continues
In 1979 with the end of a war which, for geographical
reasons, incorporated few Miskitos and the installation of a
regime which most Indians only partially understood,
Miskitos were hesitant to give up their local organization.
So they established MISURASAT A which means Miskito,
Sumu, Rama, and Sandinistas, working together ....
MISURASAT A cautiously embraced the Sandinistas.
However, in August 1980, when plans were announced for
nationalizing lands on the Atlantic Coast, MISURASATA
[which had not been consulted before the announcement]
3

ownership." That wording basically means that, like the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the Nicaragua
government is willing to recognize that the Indians only
have rights within the limits of the villages they occupy, and
implies that their rights to territory are not recognized ...
Were the Sandinista position to be adopted by the US, the
Black Hills would be automatically forfeited and the Sioux
claim would be limited to the town limits of the villages ...
All the land in between the villages would be claimed by the
US government. Point Five appears on its fact to deny all
Miskito rights under any treaties and it totally denies the
concept of aboriginal rights. . . . There is no guarantee or
even mention of any hunting and fishing rights ....
Point 6 states that ''the natural resources of our territory
are the property of the Nicaraguan people represented by
the Revolutionary State ... '' the rights of the Indians are
limited to '' ... receive a share of the benefits derived from
the exploitation of forestry resources ... in conformity with
national planning."
Were point 6 to be adopted in US law, it would mean
that the Navajo and the Lakota and the Pueblo Indians
would have no ownership rights to oil, gas, uranium or
other mineral resources, and arguably no rights to water,
and they would have no power to determine the path of
development of those resources.

quickly obtained the Council of State's approval to postpone any nationalization until Indian land claims were
settled.
The Miskito's reaction to proposed nationalization of
land and resources along the Atlantic Coast was . . . a
response to a perceived threat against their subsistence
security and their status as equals in relations with nation
states. Prior to 1980 the only serious threat to such
freedoms led to the formation of Alpromisu. As
MISURASATA worked to assure rights to land and natural
resources, its efforts produced familiar accusations of
racism, separatism, and rumors of an incipient regional
"revolt."

These accusations led to the arrest of 33 leaders of
MISURASATA in February of 1981 and to the subsequent exodus of several thousand Miskitos to neighboring Honduras.
Sandinista relations with the Indians were not helped
by the initial implementation of the literacy and
agrarian reform programs. The literacy campaign was
conducted only in Spanish despite the fact that most
Miskitos speak English, -or Indian languages. The
agrarian reform project became a cause for misunderstandings and bitterness too because agrarian reform
officials resented the reluctance on the part of the
Miskitos to depend on centralized government to supply
seeds and markets for their crops. Old arrangements
with usorious merchants may not have seemed preferable to outsiders, but at least they were dependable, of
no little importance to a subsistence farmer. These
problems, however, proved relatively minor. The
Sandinistas realized they had made mistakes and
MISURASATA officials understood that these
mistakes were, as Macdonald notes, "not structural,
but rather methodological.'' However, other more
important problems remained to be solved.

Conclusion

The Sandinistas are between a rock and a hard place,
economically, militarily, morally. Economically, they
are squeezed by the US refusal to provide economic aid
on one side, and Somoza's legacy of debt on the other.
Trying to make their economy more self-sufficjent while
repaying a staggering foreign debt, and simultaneously
needing to purchase military hardware to build up the
country's defenses is an extremely difficult task, if not an
impossible one. The lumber on the lands claimed by
MISURASATA represents a source of badly needed
export income, and so, without waiting for negotiations, Nicaragua and Mexico have already embarked on
a $56 million joint venture to cut and process lumber
from the pine savannahs of the Coast.
On the issue of security, the US is overtly supporting
counter-revolutionaries massing in Honduras for an
invasion. There have been repeated raids over the Coco
River which is the border between the two countries.
Undoubtedly part of the reason for the relocation of
thousands of Miskitos is just what the Sandinistas say it
is: the desire to remove the population from a combat
area. It is also a move to deny the Somocistas any
possible base of support in Indian communities, and to
create a demilitarized zone between Honduras and Nicaragua (the likely reason for the Sandinistas' burning of
Indian villages after relocations were completed).
However, we have to note that, according to a piece by
Macdonald in the New York Times, "resettlement
actually was conceived in 1980 as a means to move
Miskitos permanently onto 250 square-meter lots."
We can only agree with Charles R. Hale, a Sandinista
official who works on the Atlantic Coast that "(t)he
government cannot demonstrate great political flexibility as long as Nicaragua's national sovereignty
continues to be in danger.'' It is also true that some

Natural Resources

At the heart of the difficulties between the Sandinista
government and MISURASATA is the question of
natural resources: Who "owns" the Atlantic Coast?
The map that MISURASATA prepared to substantiate
Indian land claims shows that they claim over 45,000
km 2 of the Atlantic Coast, more than 380/o of Nicaragua's land total. Macdonald believes that MISURASATA is willing to negotiate this percentage and that
what is at stake is, as John C. Mohawk wrote in
Cultural Survival Quarterly, "Sandinista recognition of
the existence of Indian nations and landbase, aboriginal
rights and the right to an Indian national personality.''
These rights the Sandinistas have so far refused to
recognize. Mohawk discusses two points contained in a
document entitled "Declaration of the Principles of the
Sandinista Popular Revolution in Regards to the Indigenous Communities of the Atlantic Coast'' issued in
Managua on August 12, 1981.
Point 5 states that the government stands ready to recognize Indian land rights to '' ... the lands where they have
lived historically in the communities of the Atlantic Coast,
already being in the form of communal (sic) or cooperative
4

THE COMING WAR
WITH NICARAGUA

MISURASAT A leaders, whether or not their intentions
were originally counter-revolutionary as the Sandinistas
have charged are now openly collaborating with
Somocistas in border raids and radio broadcasts on
Radio 15 September which attempt to panic the Indian
population. But we have to ask, as Mohawk does, "Is
the defense of Indian rights a counter-revolutionary
position? . . . Are we to support Indian people in
struggle for their aboriginal rights against puppet
regimes like the Somoza government but then abandon
them when their rights are threatened by revolutionary
governments?''
Obviously the real criminal in all of this is the US
government which, by waging economic as well as
actual war on the Sandinista government is making the
chances for an MISURASATA/Sandinista rapproachment ever less likely and less possible. So should we
criticize the Sandinista government at all? I believe that
we must for three reasons: First, because the Sandinistas
are not of one mind on how to deal with the Miskitos.
For every official who believes, like the one who spoke
with Macdonald, that relocation is not a burden
because ''these people are just nomads who live in
shacks," there are others who are not ignorant of
Miskito culture and who have shown themselves willing
to negotiate and to learn; Second, because the importance of this issue extends beyond Nicaragua's borders.
Indians make up a large percentage of the population of
Latin America. In nearby Guatemala, on the brink of its
own revolution, and where latinos and Indians have
only recently joined forces, Indians are the majority of
the population. They wait and watch to see how a
revolutionary government deals with its ''Indian
problem." Finally, we must all ask ourselves John
Mohawk's question, and answer it.

JEFF McCONNELL

The next three months will be critical ones for the
·Nicaraguan people. The respected Latirt American
Weekly Report claims that there are rumors in the
Honduran armed forces that some kind of military
showdown between Nicaragua and Honduras will occur
by July. The Nation reported in January that a faction
of the Honduran military has accepted the inevitability
of a war with Nicaragua. A month earlier an unnamed
"senior State Department policymaker" told the San
Francisco Examiner that the Reagan Administration
would have to ''face up to a fundamental decision in the
next six months: whether to allow Nicaragua to consolidate its Marxist-Leninist regime, which already has
become a base for subverting the whole hemisphere, or
act to stop it.''
In late march, the National Security Council received
options papers on possible American actions toward
Nicaragua. Decisions made by the NSC in mid-November after receiving the last previous options papers led to
grim results. Ronald Reagan signed an executive order
on December 1 approving a broad program of covert
political and paramilitary actions against Nicaragua.
Almost immediately the State Department began a
large-scale propaganda campaign against Nicaragua
portraying its government as totalitarian and militaristic, bent on dominating Central America, and sold out
to Moscow. At the height of this campaign, former
National Guardsmen based in Honduras initiated
"Operation Red Christmas," a paramilitary operation
against Nicaragua in the isolated and politically sensitive Atlantic Coast region. At least sixty Sandinistas
were killed. Radio 15 September, operating from ten
miles inside Honduras, called on the Miskito Indians of
the Atlantic Coast to rise up against the Managua
government. The Sandinistas responded by clearing out
the border area, temporarily ending the attacks from
Honduras.
With good reason, however, the government expects
further repetitions. On March 6, the independent El
Nuevo Diario and the Sandinista paper Barricada
printed a description of the invasion the Sandinistas fear
to be imminent. Diversionary border attacks, according
to this account, can be expected all along the Nica~
raguan-Honduran border, while the invasion force
would land on the Atlantic Coast. Jose Cardenal stated
in a recent interview in the Mexican paper Excelsior that
his anti-Sandinista forces were waiting in the mountainous border region to begin attacks similar to those
described in the two Nicaraguan papers. And the
December San Francisco Examiner interview with US
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officials offered a similar s~e_n ~io. Pe~haps coincidentally, the Bay of Pigs invasion was mounted from· this
area along the Atlantic Coast in 1961.
It is for these and many other reasons that Nicaragua
sought the help of the UN Security Council in late
March and early Apr~. The r~sponse of the US was to
veto a measure that would have empowered the Secretary-General to investigate Nicaragua's charges that the
US was fomenting a military attack from Honduras,
charges Jeane .Kirkpatrick labeled "ridiculous." .Kirkpatrick defended the veto by arguing that the OAS, and
not the UN, was the proper forum for discussing such
charges. She did not mention the fact that many OAS
states had already given behind-the-scenes approval to
the US plan to destabilize Nicatagua, nor the fact that
several were actively plotting alongside the US.
The US has been working to build Honduras up militarily to carry out these efforts, and promoted the
cosmetic elections there in November 1981 that installed
civilians but actually left power in the hands of the military. These elections have enabled the Reagan Administration to increase military aid to Honduras and to
offer Honduras more economic aid than any other
Caribbean Basin nations except El Salvador and
Jamaica. To carry this out, the US has increased its
embassy staff 400/o over the last two years.
In November 1981, at the same time the NSC was
approving its campaign against Nicaragua and just
before the Honduran elections, the Reagan Administration installed as its new ambassador to Honduras John
Negroponte. Negroponte is an experienced diplomat
who has had ties with the CIA while serving in Saigon as
political officer from 1964 to 1968 and while on the
NSC staff during the Chile years, 1970 to 1973. He is
among those who envision a possible future regional
"gendarme" role for Honduras. Negroponte has overseen recent growth in both the CIA station and the US
military mission in Tegulcigalpa. Since late 1981, the
number of Green Berets and other military advisers in
Honduras has increased from 14 to 97. AID has financed
millions of dollars of road construction in Honduras
since 1980, presumably to make it easier to move the
Honduran army throughout the countryside, allocations for such construction increasing substantially
since Negroponte's arrival. In addition, the US and
Honduras are known to be discussing the Pentagon's
plans to build military airfields on a Honduran island in
the Gulf of Fonesca off the coast of Nicaragua. This
airfield would be used by the US to airlift troops and
supplies into the region during a crisis. The head of the
Honduran armed forces in fact said in late March that
he could foresee the use of US troops in Honduras to
defend his country - presumably from Nicaragua or
from its own population.
Right now, Honduran armed forces are being used by
the US mainly to militarize the border areas with El
Salvador and Nicaragua. As the head of the US Southern Command in, Panama Lt. Gen. Wallace Nutting
said recently, insurrections like that in El Salvador have
_historically been defeated only ''when the international

political borders have been secured." The Hondurans
have cooperated extensively with Salvadoran troops
along the common border. The Hondurans police
refugee camps inside Honduras and have allowed Salvadoran troops into them. Recently, World Vision, a
fundamentalist and steadfastly anti-communist relief
organization, took over CED EN, the ecumenical group
which has been overseeing refugees in Honduras under
UN auspices. When the staff of CEDEN resigned in
protest and formed their own organization, the chief of
the Honduran military chose the World Visioncontrolled CEDEN over the new organization to handle
the refugees. World Vision is reported to have had three
Honduran intelligence officers on its staff in the past.

The US has consistently refused offers from Nicaragua to help Nicaragua and Honduras set up a joint
border patrol to police arms traffic into El Salvador.
Instead, the US and Honduras have held joint naval
maneuvers in the Gulf of Fonesca the reason being, so
says the US, to train the Honduran navy in the interception of arms. But with the indifference shown by the
US to the border-patrol proposal as well as the recent
report by Raymond Bonner of the New York Times that
he had been told by Honduran military officers that
there was no evidence of overland arms traffic through
Honduras, Nicaraguan officials suspect the maneuvers
were staged as a provocation to Nicaragua. The inability
of the US to produce credible evidence of substantial
arms traffic has compounded the suspicion that the
arms issue is entirely US propaganda.
On the other hand, Honduran military officers have
had a hand in the border incidents between anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan exiles and the Nicaraguan army.
Thousands of these exiles operate freely from
Honduran territory. Although Honduran officials deny
this, they do not permit reporters to travel in the border
area. Anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans captured in paramilitary operations have told of involvement by top
Honduran officers. In late 1981, after the crash of a
Honduran military aircraft, among those discovered on
board was Steadman Fagoth, leader of a Miskito Indian
faction that has joined former National Guardsmen in
attacks on Sandinista troops in the Atlantic Coast
region. In late March, there were actually several minor
clashes between Nicaraguan and Honduran armed
forces.
6

tina over tactics. Although the Carter Administration
during its last months explored the possibility of
supporting former Somoza supporters, the Reagan
Administration is said to have rejected this option on
the advice of CIA officials who stated that these
Somocistas were too tainted ever to have any future
credibility among the Nicaraguan people. The US thus
decided to put its weight behind opponents of the
Sandinistas with anti-Somoza credentials. The Argentina-trained force, however, is made up largely of
Somoza supporters. Full cooperation with Argentina is
thus said to be difficult until the pro-Somoza and antiSomoza opposition groups begin to work together. The
anti-Somoza groups, sharing the US concerns, claim
they cannot do this, pragmatically or morally.
The US has actually assisted both groups of opponents, however. Pedro Ortega, a wealthy Nicaraguan
industrialist in exile, makes regular trips to Miami to
recruit other exiles into his Nicaraguan Liberation
Army, the group thought to be responsible for most of
the casualties along the Honduran border. The recruitment activities of Ortega clearly violate the Neutrality
Act, yet neither is he arrested nor is his visa revoked.
Similarly, thousands of exiles from the Somoza regime
have been permitted to settle in the US. Those not guilty
of war crimes are clearly "economic refugees," fleeing
the tighter control that the Sandinistas have placed on
the Nicaraguan economy. They should be sent back to
Nicaragua under the same laws that are said to apply to
Haitian refugees. In fact, lawyers for the Haitians
discovered a vast case of inequitable application of the
law under a discovery request filed in 1980. Many other
exiles, however, are war criminals and should, according to the law, be extradicted. However, the US has
discouraged extradition requests by Nicaragua, granting
political asylum to some, and allowing others to remain
while their asylum requests are pending. It is this pool of
exiles Ortega recruits from.
The other main exile group is the Nicaraguan Democratic Union, or UDN, the group for which the Reagan
Administration approved support. The UDN is
composed largely of business leaders and their supporters who, although they sided with the Sandinistas during
the revolution, quickly became disillusioned once they
saw · the Sandinistas move in substantive ways to
separate politics and money in Nicaragua. The UDN
and the non-military bourgeois opponents of the
Sandinistas inside Nicaragua have been the principle
exploiters of the rhetoric of human rights in order to
intimidate the Sandinistas into restoring to financial
interests the freedom to control political debate in
Nicaragua. In addition to approving support for the
paramilitary efforts of the UDN, the Reagan Administration is also supporting, through AID grants and
CIA payoffs, efforts by political parties, business
organizations and labor unions inside Nicaragua to
restore political power into the hands of those the US
can do business with.

It is unclear what role US advisers are playing in these
events. The Nicaraguan government has called the
presence of the 97 advisers "suspicious," but it has
produced no direct evidence of US involvement in the
border incidents. However, CBS reported in late March
that a US Green Beret was approached by a US officer
about possible work against Nicaragua. Also, among
the options approved in November 1981 were the
creation by the CIA of a 500-man paramilitary unit to
sabotage vital economic installations inside Nicaragua
and CIA cooperation with Argentine efforts at training
a 1000-member anti-Sandinista army in Honduras. The
Times reported in March that Americans are not to be
involved directly in these forces although two or three
Spanish-speaking CIA officers are to carry out liaison,
"sharing intelligence and pointing out targets." However, the CBS report contradicts the Times story as does
an NBC report that Americans were to be involved
directly in the operations.
Some of the duties of the 97 US advisers in Honduras
have been disclosed. Negroponte reports that eleven of
the advisers are permanently assigned to Honduras and
86 are on temporary duty with "military training
teams" (MTTs). In a six-week program that ended in
late march, three US sergeants from these MTTs taught
precision parachute jumping to seven Hondurans.
Advisers told NBC's Brian Ross that such training was
"perfect for infiltration." Other MTTs in Honduras
include a team to help enlarge the Honduran navy, a
group of specialists in airport security, a communications survey team, and a team training Hondurans in
"arms interdiction techniques." The communications
survey team is working to improve, among other things,
the ability of the army to communicate with the army
command post at Puerto Lempira, a city where exile
groups are .also known to be training Miskito refugees
from Nicaragua for paramilitary activities. A recent
Newsweek report asserted that US Green Berets among
these MTTs are training 13-year-old boys for combat.
Brian Ross reported being told by sources that advisers
are also providing weapons to exile groups being trained
by Argentine officers near Tegucigalpa.
Reporting in late February from Tegucigalpa, Alan
Riding wrote in the New York Times that ''the local
United States mission appears to have established direct
contact with Mr. Fagoth and other anti-Sandinista
leaders." Nicaraguan exiles confirmed to a KnightRidder reporter in Tegucigalpa recently that a "mechanism" had been set up "for contacts between Washington and a committee of Nicaraguan exiles representing
diverse points of view." It thus appears that implementation of the N.S.C.-approved plan may have begun.
These same exiles also confirmed that Argentina has
been involved in assisting anti-Sandinista groups in
Honduras, at least since May 1981. Other press reports
assert that Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile and
Honduras have all been involved in discussions and
preparations for op.erations similar to those approved
by the N.S.C. for as long as two years. Yet there have
reportedly been differences between the US and Argen-

Jeff McConnell is editing a book on the CIA based on a lecture series
given at MIT in January.
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GRANTS

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (PO
Box 25592, Chicago, IL 60625).

Most Resist contributors will remember the moving
demonstration in the spring of 1971 - Operation
Dewey Canyon III - when Vietnam veterans threw
back their war medals on the steps of the Capitol. This
year, the eleventh anniversary of that demonstration
and the fiftieth anniversary of the Bonus March of
World War I veterans, VVAW is sponsoring a "limited
incursion into Congressland." For four days (May 12-15)
Vietnam vets, vets from other eras, friends and supporters plan to demonstrate, rally, march, lobby and learn.
Demands that will be raised include those common to all
vets ("No VA Cutbacks"); those specific to Vietnam
vets ("Test, Treat and Compensate Agent Orange
Victims"); and those relating to a broader movement
("No Aid to El Salvador, No War").
VV AW has been in the forefront of the progressive
veterans movement since the days of the Vietnam war.
They publish a newspaper, The Veteran, with recent
issues being devoted to Agent Orange, incarcerated
veterans, and US intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua. A regular feature of The Veteran is "Recollections,'' an extremely moving column that provides a
space for veterans to communicate their experiences of
life and death in Indochina. These columns have been
collected in a pamphlet of the same name ($1.50) which
is by itself an eloquent, painful argument against war.
Resist's grant was to print a descriptive brochure setting
forth the demands of the action.

MEDIA NETWORK (208 West 13th St., NY, NY
10011)

Fortunately for all of us on the planet, the US disarmament movement is growing by leaps and bounds. In
cities and towns all over this country dedicated people
have been busy educating their friends and neighbors to
the real but preventable threat of nuclear war. An
important tool in the education process has been visual
media: films, videotapes and slideshows. A recent Resist
grant went to the Disarmament l\,_1edia Project of the
Media Network to help them collect, compile, and
disseminate information nationally about the use of
visual media for grassroots organizing on disarmament,
military spending and related issues. The crucial aspect
of this project will be the dissemination of whatever
material is generated. To this end, Media Network has
obtained the sponsorship of n_a tional organizattons with
local chapters including the· Coalition for A New
Foreign and Military Policy (49 chapters), Mobilization
for Survival (130 chapters), American Friends Service
Committee and SANE. Other organizations that they
plan to contact include the National Council of
Churches and Clergy and Laity Concerned.
CHE-LUMUMBA SCHOOL (c/o Panua Putnam,
Every Woman's Center, Wilder Hall, University of
Mass, Amherst, MA 01002).
For over ten years Che-Lumumba has been providing a
program of political education and cultural enlightenment for elementary school children from Third World
and White working class backgrounds. The school was
founded by Third World parents convinced that the
American public school system fails to teach children
the truth about their histories, the struggles of their
people and the contributions of those struggles to building the nation. Parents also felt that schools teach the
culture and ideology of the dominant class including
racism, sexism, and class exploitation. Che-Lumumba
parents believe that the essence of an alternative education must be a multicultural curriculum focusing on the
political history and culture of Third World and
working class White people. The curriculum has had a
different theme each year: Self-Determination, Workers
of the World, Coming to America (the immigrant
experience), and this year Native Americans. CheLumumba's children are studying the lifestyles,
histories and struggles of Native Americans as well as
their relationship to land and the environment. As part
of the program, the children are corresponding with
children at The Freedom School of the Mohawk Nation
in upstate New York and plan a visit there later this
year. Resist's grant provided seed money for a fundraising project · to help the school achieve greater
financial self-sufficiency. ..

During the United Nations Special
Session on Disarmament join the
massive march and rally on June
12. Then on June 14 join in a nonviolent civil disobedience action
[nonviolence training required] to
blockade the five major nuclear
powers at their Missions to the
United Nations:
• United States
• Soviet Union
• China • Britain • France
For more information, contact
Civil Disobedience Campaign
339 Lafayette Street
New York, N.Y.10012
(212) 777-4737
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